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Pyongyang is clearly in a hurry to 
develop its inter-continental ballistic 
missile capability, to enable it to deliver 
a nuclear strike on the continental US. 
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, has 
authorised more missile tests in 2017 
alone than his father, Kim Jong-Il, did 
during his entire reign from 1994-2011.
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Speculation is rife that North Korea’s burgeoning 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs will 
spark a dangerous new Northeast Asian 
arms race. In May of this year, senior officials 
in United States President Donald Trump’s 
administration reportedly confided in Australian 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop their fears that 
such an arms race was “inevitable” should 
the international community fail to rein in 
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances. 
During an interview on CNN in October 2017, 
former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
agreed, asserting that “we will now have an 
arms race–a nuclear arms race in East Asia”. 
Senior political figures like Minister Bishop and 
Secretary Clinton have encountered no shortage 
of strategic analysts willing to substantiate 
their claims. The prominent American 
commentator Michael Auslin, for instance, 
argued recently that “North Korea is ensuring a 
nuclear arms race”. Similarly, the late Desmond 
Ball pointed presciently to a predominantly 
naval Northeast Asian arms race–through 
one with clear nuclear dimensions–in a paper 
published just over half a decade ago.
The arms race concept is widely employed. 
While its precise meaning remains 
contested, most experts agree that, used 
correctly, it applies to a relatively rare 
phenomenon in international relations. 
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First and foremost, a defining characteristic 
of any arms race is the notion of “reciprocal 
interaction”. In other words, two or more states 
need to disagree over the “proper” balance 
of military power between them and they 
need to be self-consciously increasing their 
arsenals–quantitatively or qualitatively, or both–
specifically in response to that disagreement. 
Second, for arms-racing in any genuine sense of 
the term to occur, this action-reaction dynamic 
ought to be occurring rapidly. The classic 
historical example of the arms race phenomenon 
is that involving Britain and Germany in the 
period prior to the First World War. Then, the 
British responded to Germany’s naval build-up 
by developing a powerful new class of warship 
called the dreadnought, which the Germans 
subsequently copied. In the decade preceding the 
First World War, the number of dreadnoughts 
built by Britain was influenced significantly by 
the numbers built by Germany, and vice versa.
Pyongyang is clearly in a hurry to develop 
its inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
capability, to enable it to deliver a nuclear strike 
on the continental US. North Korea’s leader, 
Kim Jong-un, has authorised more missile 
tests in 2017 alone than his father, Kim Jong-Il, 
did during his entire reign from 1994-2011. 
Likewise, three of North Korea’s six nuclear 
tests have taken place under Kim Jong-un’s 
watch. Consistent with the arms race concept, 
North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho has 
indicated that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons is intended to realise a “balance 
of power with the US”. Moreover, there has 
been an evident action-reaction dynamic to 
the increasingly vitriolic statements traded 
between Kim and Trump. Beyond the rhetoric, 
however, there is very little evidence to suggest 
that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances 
are indeed reactive. Rather, they appear to 
reflect nothing other than the culmination 
of a decades-long determination to establish 
North Korea as a fully-fledged nuclear power.
There is certainly some evidence to suggest, 
however, that South Korea has been responding 
to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances 
in ways consistent with the arms race concept. 
Much to China’s chagrin, for instance, Seoul in 
July 2017 confirmed that it would proceed with 
the installation of the US Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system 
immediately following a North Korean ICBM 
test. Similarly, in September 2017 in the wake 
of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, the Trump 
administration acceded to a request from Seoul 
to remove the 500-kilogram weight limit in place 
on conventional warheads provided by the US 
to South Korea. Removing these restrictions 
affords Seoul much greater capacity to strike 
against the North in the event of conflict.
Yet South Korean responses to Pyongyang’s 
advancing nuclear and missile programs have 
not been as rapid as the arms race concept would 
anticipate. THAAD deployment, for instance, 
was politically fraught and proceeded fitfully. 
The decision to deploy was initially announced 
by the US and South Korea in July 2016. Yet this 
decision was called into question by the May 
2017 election of President Moon Jae-in. Whilst 
on the campaign trail, Moon had pledged 
to review THAAD deployment. Likewise, 
while South Korean conservatives have called 
for the redeployment of US tactical nuclear 
weapons removed in 1991 to the Peninsula, 
South Korea’s Defense Minister Song Young-
moo dismissed this as a potential reaction to 
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances 
following a meeting with his US counterpart, 
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, in October 2017.
North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho has 
indicated that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons is intended to realise a “balance of 
power with the US”.
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What such prognoses fail to account for, 
however, is the tradition of self-restraint 
which has long been a feature of Asian 
strategic culture. Writing in the late 1980s 
and challenging the conventional wisdom 
that arms control measures were next to 
non-existent in this region, for instance, the 
respected strategic commentator Gerald Segal 
concluded that informal and inherently more 
flexible arms control measures “based as much 
on unstated self-restraint” constituted one 
of “the hallmarks of Asian arms control”. 
Three decades on, it would be worth exploring 
further whether Tokyo and Seoul’s thus 
far quite measured responses in the face of 
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances are, 
in fact, a product of this deep-seated culture of 
self-restraint. Is China’s still relatively modest 
nuclear arsenal a reflection of this culture 
too? Will North Korea continue to expand 
its nuclear and missile forces indefinitely, 
or will a measure of self-restraint appear 
from Pyongyang at some point also?
Should such a culture of self-restraint today 
exist, the Singaporean practitioner Bilahari 
Kausikan calls for its abandonment. In a 
provocative, yet sophisticated contribution to 
the Northeast Asian nuclear arms race debate, 
he asserts that regional stability would be best 
served by Japan and South Korea pursuing 
nuclear weapons. Following a Waltzian logic, 
Kausikan argues that such a development would 
allow for “a six-way balance of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) among the US, China, Russia, 
Japan, South Korea and North Korea” to form. 
Just as the fear of MAD served to effectively 
deter the Americans and the Soviets from 
entering the nuclear abyss during the Cold War, 
Kausikan contends, so will it ultimately 
prove stabilising in Northeast Asia today.
However, Kausikan’s proposal underestimates 
the difficulty of applying the Cold War construct 
of MAD to contemporary Northeast Asia. 
The greater number of players involved here 
renders this region infinitely more complex and 
unpredictable than the much simpler bipolar 
world which existed during the superpower 
stalemate. Moreover, Northeast Asia’s strategic 
geography is different. As another Singaporean 
scholar Bernard Loo has recently observed, 
during the Cold War “the early warning systems 
that both superpowers maintained provided 
them with a reaction time of approximately 
30 minutes”. In Northeast Asia today, 
however, “the region is simply too compact, 
such that warning times of a pre-emptive 
first strike will be virtually non-existent”.
Growing speculation notwithstanding, the 
spectre of a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race 
thus still appears some way off. To be sure, 
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities 
are advancing faster than most analysts 
anticipated. Yet there is little evidence of 
reciprocal interaction–the very essence of arms-
racing–as a driver of North Korean behaviour.
There is some evidence to suggest the 
existence of action-reaction dynamics in 
the responses of Seoul and Tokyo to those 
North Korean advances. Again, however, 
those reactions have not occurred with 
the degree of rapidity anticipated and 
required by the arms race concept.
Further, Japanese and South Korean responses 
can also be seen as the product of the continued 
erosion of American extended nuclear 
deterrence. In other words, Tokyo and Seoul 
are not simply engaging in an arms race with 
North Korea but are also hedging against 
the risk of abandonment by the US. Indeed, 
it is not altogether inconceivable that either 
or both might ultimately embark down the 
nuclear path themselves if they no longer 
view the US nuclear umbrella as a sufficient 
deterrent to Pyongyang. Suggestions that 
such a development is inevitable, however, 
underestimates the self-restraint which has long 
been a feature of this region’s strategic culture.
While a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race seems 
unlikely at this juncture, arguments that such a 
shift might ultimately prove stabilising should 
be treated with considerable caution. Northeast 
Asia’s strategic dynamics are considerably 
more complex and fluid than those obtained 
between the superpowers during the Cold War.
Ensuring that a proper Northeast Asian 
nuclear arms race does not take off, however 
improbable one might seem, should 
thus remain a matter of high priority for 
both regional and US policymakers.
Tokyo’s reactions to North Korea’s nuclear 
and missile advances have followed a similar 
pattern. Over the course of the past quarter 
century, these advances have steadily pushed 
Japan into reforming key elements of its national 
defence policy. The August 1998 Taepodong 
missile test fired by North Korea over Japanese 
territory, for instance, pushed Tokyo into 
further reviewing its defence capabilities and, 
ultimately, cooperating with the US on ballistic 
missile defence. Likewise, North Korea’s 
October 2006 nuclear test prompted open 
discussion in Japan about the utility of 
possessing an indigenous nuclear deterrent.
Pyongyang’s most recent nuclear and missile 
tests appear to be triggering even more 
substantial reactions. They have, for example, 
prompted former Japanese Minister of Defense 
Shigeru Ishiba to raise the prospect Tokyo might 
loosen its three non-nuclear principles and 
seek to have the US introduce nuclear weapons 
into Japan. Tokyo is considering developing 
further counterstrike capabilities to provide 
a more multi-layered response strategy for 
retaliating against a North Korean attack. 
Japan’s Ministry of Defense has also requested 
an increase in the country’s defence budget for 
2018, with specific items including an onshore 
version of the Aegis missile defence system.
Yet there are also important weaknesses in 
the argument that Japan is engaged in arms 
-racing behaviour. As in the South Korean 
case, Tokyo’s reactions to North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile advances have been 
highly incremental and protracted. Contrary 
to the expectations of the arms race concept, 
it is thus hard to sustain the contention that 
Japan’s reactions to Pyongyang’s provocations 
constitute a major qualitative or quantitative 
shift, as opposed to reflecting a more considered 
military modernisation process. Mounting 
speculation that Japan “going nuclear” will be 
a central element in Northeast Asia’s emerging 
nuclear arms race runs into similar difficulties. 
Beyond the political and public arguments 
that would have to be made within Japan, 
substantial and complex operational planning 
would be needed for such a development to 
occur. As the technologically-savvy strategic 
commentator Richard Bitzinger has recently 
observed, numerous operational steps and 
capability issues would need to be resolved, 
and there is little evidence today that Japan has 
even begun to put such a process in place.
Commentators predicting the emergence of 
a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race might 
argue that South Korean and Japanese policies 
to date have only been possible because of the 
confidence that Seoul and Tokyo have had in 
the nuclear umbrella provided by their senior 
ally, the US. Yet as the confidence of Seoul and 
Tokyo in US extended nuclear deterrence erodes 
in the face of North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
advances, these commentators would argue, so 
too are the pace of Japanese and South Korean 
reactions to those advances likely to increase.
There is some evidence to suggest the 
existence of action-reaction dynamics in the 
responses of Seoul and Tokyo to those North 
Korean advances. Again, however, those 
reactions have not occurred with the degree of 
rapidity anticipated and required by the arms 
race concept.
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